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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse the corporate insolvency resolution procedures of India, UK and 
Singapore within a common framework of well-specified principles. India at present lacks a 
single, comprehensive law that addresses all aspects of insolvency of a firm. It has a multiple 
laws, regulations and adjudication fora, each of which have created opportunities for debtor firms 
to exploit the arbitrage between these to frustrate recovery efforts of creditors. This adversely 
affets the resolution process, the time to recovery and the value recovered. The importance of a 
comprehensive, well-functioning insolvency resolution framework has been documented in 
literature. In India, the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) was constituted in 2014 
with the objective of proposing a comprehensive framework for resolving the insolvency of firms 
and individuals. We undertake a comparison of the corporate insolvency resolution framework  in 
UK, Singapore and India, with the underlying motivation to highlight the similarities and 
differences across the laws, procedures and institutional context of the three countries. The 
objective of this comparison is to draw lessons for the Indian reform process, in context of the 
formation of the BLRC. The BLRC has recently proposed an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill 
(IBB) which has been presented in Parliament and is currently being deliberated upon by a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee.  
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1. Introduction 
At the current time when India, a major emerging economy, is endeavoring to revive and sustain 
its high growth rate, it is imperative that financing constraints in any form be removed and a 
favorable environment be created for fostering business and competition. In this context, a well 
functioning and orderly corporate insolvency framework consisting of well-defined rules, 
procedures and timelines as well as efficient institutions, is critical for encouraging the 
development of robust domestic credit markets. There is significant evidence in the literature that 
indicates legal protection of creditors’ rights supports development of credit markets. Studies 
have also shown when lenders can easily enforce repayment, they are more willing to extend 
credit and at lower prices. See for example, Porta et al (1996, 1997), Djankov et al (2007), Levine 
(1999), Aghion et al (1992), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Davydenko and Scharfstein (2008) and 
Qian and Strahan  (2007) among others.  
India, at present, lacks a single, comprehensive law that addresses all aspects of insolvency of an 
enterprise. The current legal and institutional framework for dealing with corporate distress is 
fragmented and dysfunctional. In fact the current system has been described as one of "capitalism 
without exit". In principle, the Companies Act, 1956 contains the main legal provisions for 
dealing with corporate insolvency. In reality though, there are two major laws regarding corporate 
insolvency, two laws regarding recovery and two regulatory provisions regarding restructuring. 
Each of these mechanisms has their own institutional context and agencies with inevitable 
conflicts of jurisdiction between them. The current system is focused on the recovery rights of 
banks as secured creditors and largely ignores the interests of unsecured creditors (such as bond 
holders), domestic institutional creditors other than banks (such as Non-Banking Finance 
Companies or NBFCs) and foreign creditors.  
Development of institutions that support the insolvency resolution process, such as dedicated 
bankruptcy benches in tribunals, official liquidators, the credit registry and credit bureaus, has 
also lagged behind, both in capacity and capability. The legal system is fragmented and fraught 
with delays in enforcement. The outcomes of the current system with regard to time taken to 
resolve corporate insolvencies, costs associated with the proceedings as well as creditors’ 
recovery rates, have been extremely poor and lagging far behind other economies, resulting in 
sustained criticisms of the overall framework over the last couple of decades. The system creates 
challenges for creditors in the form of the size and diversity of their credit portfolio and for 
debtors in the form of access to credit. 
 
The poor outcomes of India’s corporate insolvency process are reflected in the country’s rankings 
in the World Bank Doing Business Rankings (2016) as shown in Table 2. With regard to 
Insolvency Resolution, India’s rank is as low as 136 among the 184 countries surveyed. 
Outcomes on time to recover and on recovery rates are also poor. The absence of a well 
functioning and effective corporate insolvency framework reflects in the state of credit markets in 
the country. Credit markets in India are small as a proportion of its GDP (Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Moreover, banks in India have become increasingly vulnerable to the problem of stress on loans 
made to corporates. Stressed assets at banks, which include NPAs and advances that have been 
restructured, have increased from 3.6% (on a base of Rs. 23.3 trillion of advances) in 2008 to 
10.9% (on a base of Rs. 67.4 trillion of advances) in 2015. This acts as a serious constraint on the 
lending capacity of Indian banks, thereby further choking the already inadequate and shallow 
credit market, and making it harder for business enterprises to fund themselves. 
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Table 1: Insolvency resolution parameters 
Indicator India South Asia OECD 
Time (years) 4.3 2.6 1.7 
Cost (as a % of estate) 9.0 10.1 8.8 
Recovery rate (cents on the $) 25.7 36.2 71.9 
Outcome (0=piecemeal sale; 
1=going concern) 
0 0 1 
Domestic credit by financial 
sector to GDP (%) 
74.8 69.5 201.8 
Source: World Bank Doing Business, 2016; World Development Indicators, 
2015. 
 
India has, over time, become an important emerging economy experiencing high growth rates. It 
is the fifth largest economy in the world with a GDP in excess of $2 trillion and growing at an 
average rate of 5% to 7% per annum. If this growth is to be sustained, Indian debt financing has 
to move from the constraints of a limited, homogenous, bank dominated market to a large, 
heterogeneous market with a diverse set of lenders. To achieve this goal reform of the corporate 
insolvency resolution framework in the country is a critical need. In the past, policy makers have 
acknowledged this need. This was done in the form of expert committees studying the 
shortcomings of the existing framework, its adverse impact on the credit markets and making 
recommendations for reform. In implementation however, the reform process has so far taken the 
approach of “interim fixes designed to solve the problem at hand” (Aghion et al. 1992).  
 
An effort at comprehensive reform was undertake when the Ministry of Finance in India set up 
the Bankruptcy Legislative Reforms Committee (BLRC) committee in 2014. The mandate of the 
committee was to recommend an “Indian Bankruptcy Code (IBC)”, applicable to all non-financial 
corporations and individuals that would replace the existing framework. The Committee 
submitted its report and the draft Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) to the government in 
November 2015.   
 
2. Motivation for cross-country comparison and choice of countries 	  
India is not unique in seeking to reform its bankruptcy law. Djankov et al (2007) records 162 
instances of reform in bankruptcy laws across 99 countries during the 1978 - 2004 period. The 
World 
Bank records 145 instances of insolvency reforms across 82 countries from 2008 - 2016. These 
include both comprehensive and incremental reforms. The spread and frequency of reform in this 
area across countries is not surprising considering that well-functioning insolvency laws have 
been viewed as fundamental to the development and growth of robust credit markets. The process 
of legislative reform, however, is a complex one.  
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While the importance of a well-functioning insolvency resolution framework can hardly be 
overstated, there is no single, internationally accepted framework with well-defined rules and 
standards laid out for organizing an efficient in- solvency resolution process. Corporate 
insolvency regimes vary substantially across countries and in different respects. These differences 
reflect variations in their underlying economic context, legal traditions, institutional structures 
and political economy considerations. As a result, whilst the basic principles and standards of 
what comprises an effective framework are well defined, there is no generally applicable best 
design solution. Moreover, as mentioned above, insolvency laws are not static and in fact evolve 
over time, making it even more difficult to arrive at a ready recipe for designing a proper 
resolution system. However, important lessons can be learned from other countries, by 
comparison with their laws as well as by studying their experiences with legislative reform 
process.  
 
Given the absence of a universal framework for resolving corporate insolvencies, in this paper we 
compare and contrast the insolvency resolution procedures of non-financial enterprises of two 
countries namely, UK and Singapore alongside that of India. The underlying motivation of this 
comparison is to be able to systematically identify the principal elements in the construct and the 
implementation of the chosen countries’ corporate insolvency regimes. The objective is that this 
comparison will yield important lessons for India at a stage when it is poised for a significant 
reform of its corporate insolvency laws. A comparison with systems of other countries will enable 
its learning process in designing its own.  
 
The choice of UK, and Singapore for the cross-country comparison has been motivated by three 
factors. First, each of these countries follows the common law legal tradition. UK, in fact, is the 
country of origin for corporate insolvency law, which emerged as an outcome of the limited 
liability company structure. Both Singapore and India follow the common law tradition and their 
insolvency codes find their origins in the English system. Second, despite the common legal 
tradition, the three countries' laws have followed different evolutionary paths and have achieved 
different outcomes. This is reflected in their rankings in the “Insolvency Resolution” area of the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report, 2016. UK ranks 13, Singapore ranks 27 whereas India has 
a rank of 136. It also reflects in the size and structure of credit markets in these countries. Table 2 
shows that while banks are the dominant source of credit to the non-financial sector in India, the 
UK and Singapore have larger credit markets, a significant share of which is with non-bank 
sectors', including debt capital markets.  
 
Finally, each of these countries is at a different stage in the process of reform of its corporate 
insolvency framework. UK has already undertaken two rounds of significant reform, in 1986 and 
in 2002. The 1986 reform was comprehensive and was based on the Cork Committee report of 
1982. Singapore is in the advanced stages of reforming its code. The Insolvency Law Reform 
Committee (ILRC) of Singapore, set up in 2010, submitted its recommendations in 2013. India 
initiated major reforms in 2014, with the Ministry of Finance constituting the BLRC.  
 
In this paper we compare the Indian framework for insolvency resolution with that in the UK and 
Singapore and highlight the lessons from this comparison that aided the BLRC in designing the 
economic thinking behind the draft IBC. 	  
3. Corporate insolvency system: function, form and objectives 
 
Before launching into a cross-country comparison, it is useful to layout a context. Some key 
elements that need to be considered when evaluating a corporate insolvency system are:  
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Role: The corporate insolvency system performs an important function in an economy-that of 
dealing with firm distress. Distress in firms can be of two types: (1) financial distress, where the 
firm has a viable business but an unviable financial structure; and (2) economic distress, where 
the firm’s business itself is unviable. The basic role of an insolvency resolution system is to 
preserve fundamentally “viable” firms and liquidate “unviable” firms.  
 
Table 2: Insolvency resolution parameters and credit markets 
Indicator UK Singapore India 
Rank 13 27 136 
Time (years) 1.0 0.8 4.3 
Cost (as a % of estate) 6.0 3.0 9.0 
Recovery rate (cents on the $) 88.6 89.7 25.7 
Outcome (0=piecemeal sale; 
1=going concern) 
1 1 0 
Domestic credit by financial 
sector to GDP (%) 
171.5 126.3 74.8 
Bank credit to GDP (%) 85.3 56.5 93.1 
Source: World Bank Doing Business, 2016; BIS Debt Statistics, 2014; World 
Development Indicators, 2015. 
 
System: The framework for corporate insolvency includes not just the law but also other 
elements that contribute to the achievement of the objectives to which this law is directed. The 
corporate insolvency system, hence, includes:  
• The legal system – the law of insolvency, its rules of procedure and the interaction of this 
law with other laws of the country.  
• The adjudication system – the formal process for insolvency resolution is essentially a 
judicial process and the courts and judiciary form an integral part of it.  
• The professional system – the professionals that provide services to- wards the 
insolvency resolution process.  
• The information system–information regarding firm’s finances, database for defaults, 
credit registries, collateral/security information etc.  
For the system to be effective, each of these elements individually and together need to 
be effective.  
 
Form: The law of insolvency takes different forms across countries. In some countries, it is 
contained in a separate insolvency code, while in others it may be scattered across various laws 
and debt collection systems. Similarly, there are variations in the institutional mechanisms.  
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Outcomes: The outcome of the process is a resolution of the firm’s distress in one of three ways: 
(1) The firm is restructured and returns to profitable trading, through a change in its financial 
structure, the terms of its liability contracts or a reorganisation of the firm itself; (2) Its business 
or assets get sold off to interested parties, prior to a liquidation; or (3) It enters immediate 
liquidation.  
 
Principles: Regardless of the differences in form, an effective framework needs to have the 
following principles built into it:  
• Efficiency: The framework should minimise probability of default (PD) ex ante and 
maximise loss given default (LGD) during insolvency and ex post. This is critical in 
financial contracts, where the time value of money is paramount.  
• Accountability: The framework should create accountability for parties in a debt 
contract and from participants in the insolvency resolution process (courts, IPs). It should 
create disincentives for strategic behaviour ex ante, ad interim and ex post.  
• Expertise: In insolvency, there is no unique and optimal equilibrium. An effective 
system acknowledges this and enables negotiation-based outcomes aided by experts. It 
also means that the law is sup- ported by clarity of procedures as well as capacity and 
capability of institutional systems.  
• Fairness: The concept of fairness in insolvency has multiple dimensions. For creditors, it 
means that similar creditor groups should be treated similarly and as far as possible pre-
insolvency priorities should be maintained. For debtors, it means that the framework 
should seek to preserve viable firms and only liquidate the unviable ones.  
 
4. Comparison of the laws  
 
The law dealing with corporate insolvency varies both in form and in substance across the UK, 
Singapore and India. In UK and in Singapore the formal procedures are contained in a single law 
(except Scheme of Arrangement in the UK which is contained in the Companies Act), whereas in 
India, they are fragmented across laws. In the UK, till 1985, the provisions for dealing with 
insolvency were contained in the UK Companies Act. In 1986, based on the recommendations of 
the Insolvency Law Review Committee, chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, the Insolvency Act, 1986 
was enacted. This Act carved out and consolidated all the insolvency-linked provisions. The first 
part of this Act had provisions for corporate insolvency and the second part had provision for 
individual insolvency. The Companies Act provisions were more liquidation focused and this Act 
sought to create a balance by introducing provisions to enable the reorganisation of companies, 
where feasible.3 The Act was significantly amended in 19944, 20045 and in 20056. The Insolvency 
Rules, 1986 form the subordinate legislation for insolvency and contain both key provisions and 
procedural guidelines.  
 	  
3	    A new procedure, Administration, was introduced by this Act 
4  The 1994 amendment addressed issues regarding the personal liabilities of Administrators and 
Administrative Receivers. 
5  The 2000 amendment introduced new provisions for company voluntary arrangements and moratorium. 
6  In 2002, the Enterprise Act further significantly amended the provisions of the Insolvency Act, 1986. It 
abolished Administrative Receivership, except in certain specified cases. It also provided that a prescribed part of the 
floating charge realisations (subject to a maximum of GBP 600,000) be made available for recovery of unsecured 
creditors dues. Another big change was the abolition of Crown preference in the statutory priority. 
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Both in Singapore and in India, the respective Companies Acts continue to be the primary laws 
for dealing with insolvency. Despite the similarity in form, some key differences exist in the two 
countries laws. In Singapore the Companies Act 2006 is the primary corporate insolvency law 
and contains procedures for reorganisation and liquidation of companies.7 In contrast, the Indian 
Companies Act, 1956 deals mainly with liquidation and winding up of companies, with 
insolvency as one of the conditions for winding up.8 The only formal provisions for 
reorganisation of insolvent companies are laid out in the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA), 
1985. This law, however, deals only with a sub-set of companies that are eligible9 and are deemed 
to be sick10. 
 
This structure, where the laws are not consolidated, creates several challenges in India. 
Companies that are not eligible under SICA, have no formal reorganisation procedures available 
to them. A large number of micro and small enterprises do not register as companies. Such firms 
have no access to any insolvency provisions.  
 
Another important aspect of the legal framework is the interaction of insolvency laws with other 
laws of the country. These could be laws pertaining to: the general functioning of companies11, 
contract enforcement12, employees/labour and their benefits13 the functioning of financial 
markets14, human rights etc. In the UK and Singapore, laws deal with the interaction of the 
insolvency law with other laws of the land through a combination of judicial interpretation and 
legislative carve-outs. This appears to be working well and reflects in their relatively low time to 
resolution in these countries (Table 2). In India, interaction between laws is fraught with 
complexity and, combined with judicial delays, has been one of the causes for delays in 
resolution (Ravi, 2015). 
 
Lesson 1: We require a single, consolidated law with well defined interaction with other laws. 
 
5. Comparison of the institutional setting 
 
5.1. Courts 
 	  
7  Part VIII (Receivers and Managers), VIIIA (Judicial Management) and X (Winding up) of the Companies 
Act, 2006. 
8  Part VII of the Act (Section 425 – Section 560) addresses the subject of winding up of registered companies 
and Part X (Section 582-590) addresses the winding up of unregistered companies, including foreign companies, 
partnerships, societies and associations with more than seven members. 
9  Industrial companies defined as a company existing immediately before the commencement of the Sick 
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Amendment Act, 1993, and registered for not less than five years. 
10  Sick companies defined industrial companies as having at the end of any financial year accumulated losses 
equal to 50% of its peak networth during the immediately preceding four financial years. 
11  Companies Act 
12  Contract laws, individual enforcement rights of creditors. 
13  Employee laws, Union related laws, special laws for workers/labour, pensions laws. 
14  Specially with respect trading on exchange platforms. 
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Courts play an important role of adjudicating the insolvency proceedings. Across countries, their 
role varies from dispute resolution, to ensuring that the law is applied duly and without prejudice, 
to, in some countries, even adjudging the resolution proposal for the distressed firm. Courts 
exercise significant discretion in all matters, including economic and commercial issues. Further, 
the timeliness of insolvency proceedings depends on the capacity (ability to deal with case 
volume) and capability (ability to deal with specialised economic and commercial matters) of the 
court system.  
 
Both the UK and Singapore have a single adjudicating authority for dealing with insolvency 
related matters. In the UK, the Chancery Division of the High Court hears corporate insolvency 
matters. This court deals primarily with matters related to business and trade disputes, intellectual 
property and trusts and inheritance. From 2008 to 2014, approximately 18,000-25,000 new 
corporate insolvency cases were filed in the UK every year. In Singapore the High Court deals 
with all corporate insolvency matters. Adequate court capacity has been developed to ensure 
timeliness and effective resolution.  
 
In India however, the fragmentation of the laws for liquidation and reorganisation is further 
complicated by the presence of separate adjudicating authorities under each. High Courts in India 
primarily deal with writ petitions15 and are the courts of appeal for civil and criminal matters. 
However, for certain company related matters like liquidation and winding up, they also exercise 
original jurisdiction under the Companies Act. Given the problem of delays in company 
liquidation proceedings in the High Courts, when SICA was enacted, a specialist tribunal was 
created to administer it to ensure the speediness of the rescue process. The Board of Industrial 
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and the Appellate Authority of Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (AAIFR) were set up, which are deemed to be civil courts16, and have jurisdiction 
over reorganisation cases under SICA.  
 
The courts face serious capacity challenges that reflect in their high levels of pendency. Data 
from BIFR shows that the average pendency of BIFR cases is 4.5 years. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the pendency of liquidation cases in High Courts is 9-10 years (Eradi, 2000). 
 
The presence of multiple laws and adjudication fora has also created opportunities for the debtor 
firms to exploit the arbitrage between the two systems to frustrate the recovery efforts of creditors 
and to adversely impact the timeliness of the resolution process.17 SICA provides that the orders 
and proposals made under the Act cannot be appealed in any other civil court except the AAIFR, 
However the BIFR and the AAIFR are deemed quasi-judicial bodies and hence subordinate to the 
High Court. This means decisions taken by them can be appealed at the High Court. Ravi, 2015 
finds that, often BIFR and AAIFR decisions are reviewed afresh by the High Courts. 
 
Lesson 2: We require a single adjudicating authority with adequate capacity to ensure timeliness 
in adjudication. 
 
Lesson 3: We need to precisely define the role of the adjudicating authority and build capacity at 
courts commensurate with their role in the process. 	  
15  Under Article 226 of the Constitution 
16  For the purpose of Section 195 and 196 of Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973. 
17  Also referred to as forum shopping. 
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5.2. Insolvency Professionals 
 
Insolvency professionals such as liquidators and administrators play a central role in insolvency 
proceedings. Their role may range from due diligence, valuation, management of the company 
during the proceedings, to preparation and implementation of the resolution proposal and 
realisation and distribution of proceeds. In doing all these, they need to ensure that due process in 
compliance of the law is followed and hence, it is important that they have adequate knowledge 
of the law, sufficient experience in commercial and financial matters and integrity in their 
functioning.18  
 
In the UK, Insolvency Practitioners (IP) are a private competitive industry regulated by the 
government. The ministerial responsibility for insolvency matters rests with the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). The Insolvency Service, an executive body of the BIS is 
the regulator for this area and specifically for the IPs who are regulated under the Insolvency Act.  
An IP needs to be licensed before being appointed in relation to an insolvency matter. The 
standards for licensing, practice, setting fees are well defined and monitored by seven 
professional bodies that also act as Self Regulating Organisations (SRO)19. Applicants need to 
pass a qualifying exam20 in addition to meeting the authorising body’s insolvency experience 
requirements. A licensed IP can be appointed as an Administrator, Liquidator, Receiver or 
Supervisor in an insolvency procedure.  
 
In Singapore, the Insolvency and Public Trustees Office of the Ministry of Law empanels and 
regulates a private industry of insolvency professionals. The qualifications for becoming an 
insolvency professional are laid out in the Companies Act and typically vary based on the type of 
case that they are appointed to.21 In most cases the government Official Assignee or the Official 
Receiver is appointed to administer insolvency.  
 
In India, the Official Liquidators are appointed by the central government and each High Court 
has the office of an OL attached to it. The provisions for appointment of an OL are laid out in the 
Companies Act22. Under SICA, generally a public financial institution or a scheduled bank acts as 
an operating agency (OA)23 and aids the eligible company in proposing a draft rehabilitation plan. 
In addition to being plagued with capacity challenges, the role and incentives of the OLs and OAs 
in the insolvency resolution process has received much criticism (Eradi, 2000). 	  
18  International Monetary Fund Orderly and Effective Insolvency procedures, 1999 – Chapter on Institutions 
and Participants. 
19  The following professional bodies have been authorised by the Insolvency Service to conduct exams and 
provide oversight to IPs from within their domain: (1) Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; (2) Insolvency 
Practitioners Association; (3) Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales; (4) Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland; (5) Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland; (6) Law Society of Scotland; and (7) The 
Solicitors Regulation Authority. 
20  JIEB exams 
21  For example: A Judicial Manager has to be a public accountant. A liquidator must be a public accountant 
who is certified as an approved liquidator by the government. 
22  There are a total of 22 OLs across 24 High Courts in India. 
23  There are 24 OAs. 
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Lesson 4: We require the private sector to step in to create a competitive industry of insolvency 
professionals. 
 
Lesson 5: We require strong oversight regulation to enforce minimum standards of professional 
and ethical conduct, and to formulate correct incentives for insolvency professionals. 
 
6. Comparison of procedures 
 
There two main possible outcomes for a firm in distress. It can either get reorganised and 
continue as a going concern or it can get liquidated. Reorganisation of a firm can be through: (i) 
an informal work-out, where the debtor firm and its creditors agree to a plan of reorganisation 
through private negotiations; (ii) a voluntary reorganisation process under the law, where the 
negotiations are voluntary but are conducted under the supervision of the court; and (iii) a formal 
process for assessing viability and deciding between reorganisation and liquidation, typically 
supervised by the court. Liquidation in turn can have two procedures: (i) voluntary liquidation, 
where the firm itself proposes liquidation when it becomes insolvent; and (ii) compulsory 
liquidation, where the creditor(s) applies to the court for liquidating the firm. In addition to these, 
several countries also have individual enforcement procedures available to certain eligible 
creditors. These provide creditors powers in addition to their ability to exercise their own security 
interest.  
 
The wide variety of procedures available reflects the complexity in dealing with a failing firm. 
There are two models that countries follow in the design of their procedures. Some countries 
follow the linear model, where a common linear process evaluates the viability of the firm before 
deciding whether it should be reorganised or liquidated. For example, under the new German law, 
all insolvencies are conducted initially under the same rules and, for an initial period of up to 
three months, there is no presumption as to whether the enterprise will be rehabilitated or 
liquidated. The proceedings only separate into liquidation and rehabilitation processes once a 
determination has been made as to whether rehabilitation is, in fact, possible.  
 
Given the complexity and subjectivity in assessment of value, most countries follow a non-linear 
model where both reorganisation and liquidation procedures are made available to concerned 
parties and the choice of procedure is left to the party initiating the process. Since all procedures 
have costs associated with them, it is expected that parties will choose those procedures that will 
minimize their costs while yielding the highest value. Each of these models has advantages and 
disadvantages. A linear model is well suited for countries that are capacity constrained in 
institutional infrastructure. However, they impose an additional cost of a common procedure on 
all parties. The non-linear model provides choice to the concerned parties but adds to complexity.  
 
 
6.1. Reorganisation procedures 	  
The objective of a reorganisation procedure is to either enable the distressed firm to return to 
profitable trading or to preserve its business as a going concern, even if the company gets 
liquidated. This is because, unlike liquidation, which creates value only for the recipients of the 
liquidation proceeds, reorganisation creates value for all stakeholders and the economy in general.  
 
For a reorganization procedure to be used and for it to achieve its objective, its design needs to 
create appropriate incentives for both the debtor and creditors. Creditors must be incentivised to 
participate in reorganisation proceedings by giving them the confidence that these will not be 
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used to delay liquidation and to undermine the value of their claims. For example, reorganisation 
proceedings need to be time bound and give control to creditors to approve or reject the plan of 
reorganisation or to convert it to liquidation proceedings. Further, creditors that have security 
over the firm’s assets also need confidence that they would get at least as much as they would in 
liquidation.  
 
Debtors must be incentivised to trigger formal proceedings at the early signs of distress. This is 
unlikely to happen if initiation of insolvency proceedings automatically takes away control of the 
business from them. However, debtors may be incentivised to trigger even if they lose control, if 
they receive relief from creditor or legal action through a moratorium. Also, punitive measures 
for company directors who delay insolvency proceedings despite being aware of distress, may 
further aid the process. 
 
6.1.1. Formal procedure for assessing value  
Administration in the UK, Judicial Management in Singapore and BIFR filings in India are 
formal reorganisation procedures. The main differences in procedure across the three countries 
are as follows: 
 
• In the UK and Singapore, both the debtor and the creditors can initiate the procedure. In 
India, the primary onus of initiating the procedure lies with the debtor. If the company or 
its unsecured creditors trigger the procedure, actual or impending insolvency needs to be 
established for the procedure to commence. Only if a creditor with a qualified floating 
charge (QFC) initiates the procedure, insolvency does not need to be established. In 
Singapore, evidence of inability to pay debts is required. Both these facilitate trigger by a 
debtor on early signs of distress. In India, erosion of balance sheet net worth is the trigger 
for the procedure. This creates disincentives for early trigger by debtors. 
 
• Both in the UK and in Singapore, the existing management and Board of the company 
lose control of the business of the company. A moratorium on creditor actions and legal 
suits comes into force for a defined period of time once insolvency proceeding is 
triggered. In India, while a moratorium comes into force, the existing management and 
Board remain in control during the procedure. 
 
• Both in the UK and Singapore, the reorganisation plan is adopted through a vote by the 
creditors' committee where as in India, the BIFR adjudges and approves the plan. 
 
• In the UK, the Administrator is generally appointed by the debtor with the consent of the 
creditors. In Singapore, the Judicial Manager is appointed by the court and is monitored 
by the court and by a committee of the creditors. In India, the Operating Agency under 
SICA is appointed by and acts under the directions of the court. The key decisions 
regarding rehabilitation are thus made by the court. 
 
• The court's role is the lowest in the UK where it is not uncommon for an Administration 
to complete without a court judgment. The court mainly acts as a body for dispute 
resolution and providing guidance to the Administrator. In Singapore, the court plays a 
more active role in the process and can adjourn creditors' meeting, as well as allow 
amendments to the rescue plan. In India, the BIFR plays the critical role in deciding on 
the plan of rehabilitation. 
 
6.1.2. Voluntary reorganisation 	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Voluntary reorganisation procedure enables debtors to negotiate with their creditors under the 
supervision of the court. The key difference between these and the formal reorganisation 
procedure is that, (i) insolvency does not need to be established for the use of this procedure, and 
(ii) the debtor remains in control during the procedure. 
 
The UK has two procedures for voluntary reorganisation, the Company Voluntary Arrangement 
(CVA) under the Insolvency Act and the Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act. A 
CVA enables a company to restructure its debt or reorganise its business, with the consent of its 
creditors while a Scheme could be an arrangement with creditors for debt restructuring, mergers 
and takeovers or other forms of reconstruction such as capital structure changes. A CVA can only 
be proposed by the Board of a company, and does not require any evidence of current or 
impending insolvency. The Board of the company retains control and, with the help of an IP, 
proposes a reorganisation plan for approval by the creditors and the shareholders of the company.  
A Scheme of Arrangement is proposed by the Board of the company, which retains control during 
the Scheme and proposes a plan for consideration by the creditors. There is no IP involved in the 
process. A Scheme is subject to close judicial scrutiny for procedural compliance and is approved 
by a creditors’ vote and by the court.  
 
In the UK, companies may prefer the voluntary reorganisation proceedings as they allow for 
reorganisation to be proposed even when there is no actual or impending insolvency. The other 
difference is that the Board retains control during these procedures whereas in Administration, the 
Board loses control. The problem however is that both these procedures do not have a 
moratorium period that allows companies to negotiate with their creditors. Further, a CVA plan, 
though light on court involvement, cannot be crammed down on secured creditors. While a 
Scheme can be crammed down on all creditors, the extent of court involvement makes it an 
expensive procedure. As a result of these shortcomings, both these procedures are not used 
frequently and Administration continues to be the procedure of choice for reorganization.  
 
In Singapore, voluntary reorganisation can only be through a Scheme of Arrangement under the 
Companies Act, a procedure very similar to the Scheme in UK. The Board of the company 
proposes a Scheme and retains control during its approval process and its implementation. The 
court is closely involved in the approval process and in determining whether the Scheme is fair 
and reasonable. A validly approved Scheme is binding on all creditors. Similar to the process in 
UK, Schemes are wide ranging and include any form of compromise or ‘give-and-take’ 
agreements between debtors and creditors, including debt for equity conversions, debt 
moratoriums, extended repayment schedules, fresh equity contributions, or in the case of a group, 
its reorganization or merger.  
 
In India, Scheme of Arrangement is allowed under the Companies Act and the procedure is 
similar to the UK and Singapore. A company or its creditors can make an application to the court 
to call for a meeting of the creditors to approve a Scheme. Till SICA was enacted in 1985, the 
Scheme of Arrangement was the only procedure available to companies for reorganisation. This 
holds true even today for companies that are not eligible under SICA. 
 
6.1.3. Informal workouts 	  
The insolvency resolution law can create ex ante incentives for the debtor and the creditors to 
voluntarily negotiate in the shadow of the formal process. This is optimal because formal 
insolvency procedures come at a cost, both monetary and reputational. However, a voluntary 
solution can be worked out only if parties have recourse to the formal framework in the case of a 
breakdown in negotiations. 
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In the UK, there is an informal, non-binding process for workouts using the London Approach, 
supported by guidelines from the Bank of England. In Singapore, informal workouts are aided by 
the INSOL principles laid out in the Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi 
Creditor Work-outs, 2000. The four main principles on which this approach relies are: (i) 
Standstill-lenders agree to not exercise individual enforcement rights while the work-out is being 
considered; (ii) Information-all decisions are made based on reliable information that must be 
shared between all lending banks and that remains confidential; (iii) Negotiation and decision on 
viability-lending banks should take a collective view on whether to support the debtor and in 
what form; and (iv) Business plan and new money-all lending banks should share the burden of 
supporting the debtor.  
 
In India, procedures for informal workouts have evolved as a consequence of the failure of the 
formal framework rather than on the back of it. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has set up the 
Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) process, the Joint Lenders' Forum (JLF) and the Strategic 
Debt Restructuring (SDR) process as an alternate system of insolvency resolution. These provide 
RBI-regulated lenders, mainly banks, mechanisms to recover or restructure their loans to 
companies.  
 
The Indian CDR mechanism, while based on the ‘London Approach’, which encourages creditors 
to opt for an out-of-court agreement, differs from it in many respects. Unlike the London 
Approach, which is an informal procedure, CDR is a formal process where the decision to grant a 
CDR to a company is taken by a body of institutional creditors namely banks, financial 
institutions and asset reconstruction companies and is governed by detailed guidelines issued by 
RBI.24 These guidelines include norms on eligibility of companies for CDR, the nature of the 
restructuring, the timelines, the roles and responsibilities of the parties and the procedure for exit 
from CDR. The CDR process is also unique in that the RBI provides relief on prudential norms 
for loan accounts that have been restructured using the CDR mechanism. Over time, in India, 
CDR has become a mechanism for addressing the asset quality problem of banks rather than a 
mechanism for reorganizing distressed companies. 
In addition to CDR, in June 2015, RBI introduced a Strategic Debt Restructuring (SDR) 
mechanism to help banks recover their loans by taking control of the distressed listed companies. 
Under this scheme a consortium of lending institutions or Joint Lenders’ Forum (JLF) may at 
their discretion, convert loan dues into equity shares. At the time of initial restructuring, the JLF 
must incorporate an option in the loan agreement to convert the entire or part of the loan 
including the unpaid interest into equity shares if the company fails to achieve the milestones and 
critical conditions stipulated in the restructuring package. 
This option must be corroborated with a special resolution since the debt-equity swap will result 
in dilution of existing shareholders. This scheme will result in lenders acquiring 51% ownership 
of the distressed companies. From the time SDR is invoked, JLF must approve the debt-equity 
conversion within 90 days. JLF will get 90 more days to actually do the conversion. Thereafter, 
JLF will hold the existing asset status of the loan for 18 more months once the debt-equity 
conversion is completed. At the end of 18 months JLF must divest their holdings in the equity of 
the company. The biggest challenge under this scheme will be for the lenders to continue to run 
the distressed companies till they are able to find a suitable buyer. It can be a chicken and egg 
situation wherein until the companies are turned around and become viable, finding a suitable 	  
24  Issued first in 2008 and further augments in 2012 and 2013. 
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buyer might be difficult and may take much longer than 18 months. The primary incentive to use 
these mechanisms is related to the asset reclassification benefits provided by the RBI to lenders 
who participate.  
Lesson 6: We require early trigger of the resolution process. We require both the debtor and the 
creditors to have the ability and the incentives to trigger early. 
 
Lesson 7: We need to ensure that assessment of viability of a company is done by the concerned 
parties. Courts should merely aid but not adjudicate upon this decision. 
 
Lesson 8: We require a procedure design that will set the correct ex ante incentives for all 
parties. For example, penalty for fraudulent or frivolous triggers, loss of control by existing 
management in exchange for a moratorium, and safeguards against abuse of process by debtor, 
creditors and IP. 
 
Lesson 9: We need to ensure that while an effective formal framework may create ex ante 
incentives for informal workouts in the 'shadow of the law', informal workouts cannot replace a 
formal, all encompassing framework. 
 
6.2. Liquidation 	  
Liquidation of a distressed company should, in theory, occur only if it is economically unviable. 
In practice, liquidation is the most likely outcome in insolvency. Preserving value in liquidation 
and ensuring that it is conducted in an orderly manner as compared to a piecemeal liquidation by 
creditors racing to collect their dues is an important function of the insolvency resolution process. 
An effective and timely liquidation process is characterized by three features: 
1. It provides certainty to creditors regarding a minimum level of recovery and of the 
priority in distribution;  
2. It provides a time-bound exit to the debtor company and allows capital to be released for 
more productive deployment; and 
3. It creates a ‘threat’ in the context of which parties consider and implement reorganisation. 
 
In the UK, Singapore and in India, liquidation precedes the winding up of the company. In the 
UK, winding up is a remedy available under the Insolvency Act, 1986, while in Singapore and 
India, it is available under the respective Companies Acts. The general procedure followed in the 
three countries is very similar to each other. There are two modes of winding up in an insolvency 
situation. The first is a voluntary winding up by creditors. In this procedure, the company, 
through a resolution of its shareholders and in consultation with its creditors, petitions the court to 
be wound up without making an accompanying declaration of solvency. The second is a 
compulsory winding up by the court and is initiated by the creditors. A creditor can initiate 
compulsory winding up proceedings through an application to court on grounds that company has 
either defaulted in a debt of a defined threshold or is unable to pay its debts as they come due. 
The liquidation procedure has several key components: (i) the commencement of liquidation and 
appointment of a third-party administrator known as the liquidator; (ii) administration of the 
company’s affairs and assets by liquidator; (iii) ascertainment of company’s liabilities and 
recovery and realisation of company’s assets; (iv) distribution of the proceeds of realisation to 
company’s creditors and members; and (v) the eventual dissolution of the company.  
In Singapore and the UK, creditors nominate the liquidator, and the court usually accedes to this 
nomination. In India, each bench of the High Court has an Official Liquidator attached to it. The 
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court appoints the OL for liquidation proceedings. Once a liquidation proceeding is commenced, 
the company normally ceases business. The liquidator is empowered to manage the affairs of the 
company in liquidation. In both compulsory and voluntary winding up, there is no statutory time 
limit on liquidation proceedings. 
The big difference across the countries is in the time taken for the liquidation proceedings to be 
completed.  In the UK and in Singapore, liquidation proceeding may get completed within a 
period of 1-2 years. In India, on the other hand, these proceedings go on for around 9-10 years on 
average, and up to 25 years in some cases. Liquidation should be a credible ‘threat’ that keeps the 
debtor and the creditors on the negotiating table during the insolvency resolution process. Delays 
of the type witnessed in India reduce the confidence of concerned parties in the formal resolution 
framework. 
 
Furthermore, a well-defined priority of distribution of liquidation proceeds provides the creditors 
the ability to estimate their loss-given-default. This plays a critical role in the development of the 
credit markets. For example:  
• Financiers will be wiling to extend interim financing during the insolvency process only 
if they are given super-priority; 
• Secured creditors need to know that they will receive priority in liquidation payments to 
the extent of their security;  
• In the UK, the Crown gave up its priority on tax dues in exchange for a defined amount 
of payment to the unsecured creditors. This was done to promote unsecured credit in the 
economy. 
 
In India, interim finance during insolvency does not get priority. This reflects in BIFR cases in 
the form of lenders’ unwillingness to extend any further credit to the company. Secured creditors 
in India prefer the use of individual enforcement under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of 
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI 2002) to the formal 
framework for insolvency resolution as, in the latter their rights are pari passu with workers. 
 
Lesson 9: We require timely and effective liquidation. 
 
Lesson 10: We require a well-defined priority of distribution of liquidation proceeds. This sets ex 
ante incentives for development of credit markets as well as for use of the formal resolution 
framework by various classes of creditors. 
 
6.3. Individual enforcement procedures 
 
In addition to the formal procedures for reorganisation and liquidation, each of these countries 
also has an individual enforcement procedure available to certain categories of secured creditors. 
Administrative Receivership in the UK, Receivership in Singapore and SARFAESI (The 
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act) 
in India fall under this category. The powers available to eligible creditors under these procedures 
are founded on the principle of enforcement of security rights and go far beyond contract 
enforcement. These include the power to take action without court sanction, the power to 
Take over running of the company and precedence over formal reorganisation and liquidation 
proceedings. 
 
The Administrative Receivership procedure in the UK was available to a specific category of 
secured creditors known as ‘floating charge holders’ and provided wide array of powers for 
recovery of dues, including sale or liquidation of the company. The Enterprise Act, 2002 
	   16	  
abolished Administrative Receivership prospectively. This was done to strengthen the 
Administration procedure and to increase the possibility of reorganisation. In Singapore, 
Receivership is a common remedy used by secured creditors and has precedence over liquidation 
and Judicial Management. In India, the SARFAESI Act, 2002 provides wide ranging powers to 
some categories of secured creditors with regard to recovery of the loans made by them. It allows 
eligible lenders to take possession of the collateral security without even court intervention. They 
also have the power to take over the management of the company and to stay BIFR and 
liquidation proceedings if they comprised a certain threshold in value. 
 
Lesson 12: We need to ensure that individual enforcement procedures for secured creditors, 
coexist with the formal framework for insolvency resolution. 
 
Lesson 13: We require a balance between enforcing property rights of individual creditors and 
collective resolution of insolvency for the benefit of all creditors. 
 
7. Economic rationale behind IBC 
 
A comprehensive analysis of the laws and procedures of the three countries yields crucial lessons 
for the way forward for India. These have been incorporated in the economic rationale behind the 
design of the Insolvency and Bankrupty Code proposed by the BLRC in November 2015: 
• A consolidated Code. 
• An institutional framework for implementing the Code consisting of a single adjudicating 
authority supported by a court administrative unit, and a regulated but private and 
competitive industry of insolvency professionals. 
• A collective, time bound process to assess the viability of an enterprise. 
• Assessment of viability by concerned private individuals, treated as a commercial 
decision.  
• A calm period in which to assess viability along with moratorium imposed on claims and 
balanced by the transfer of control of the company from the debtor to the insolvency 
professional.  
• The insolvency professional to be liable to the committee of creditors. 
• A timely liquidation process with a well-defined waterfall of priorities. 
• Design of the code to enable appropriate ex-ante incentives through penalties for 
fraudulent or frivolous trigger, wrongful trading, extortionate transactions, fraudulent 
preference and several such built in safeguards. 
• A balance between individual enforcement rights and collective resolution; moratorium 
to apply even to SARFAESI actions and enforcement rights under SARFAESI to be re-
instated on the lifting of the moratorium. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The objective of our paper is to analyze the corporate insolvency resolution procedures of India, 
Singapore and the UK. The underlying motivation of this exercise is to highlight the similarities 
as well as differences across the laws and procedures of these three countries and to learn 
important lessons for India, in context of the formation of a new committee in 2014 to reform the 
country’s corporate bankruptcy law. The fragmentation of the existing legal framework and the 
delays in enforcement in India have created incentives for rent seeking by various participants in 
the insolvency process. If a robust market for credit is to develop in India, the corporate 
insolvency process must give clarity to all debtors as well as all classes of creditors about the 
procedures and rules to deal with in an event of insolvency. Only then will a credit market 
without concentration of any one class of debtors or creditors can develop. 
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A comprehensive analysis of the laws of these three countries yields some crucial lessons for the 
way forward for India. The presence of multiple laws and adjudication fora has created 
opportunities for the debtor firms to exploit the arbitrage between the systems to frustrate the 
recovery efforts of creditors and to adversely impact the timeliness of the resolution process. 
Thus, it is imperative to consolidate the multiple laws and fora in India, a strategy that seems to 
work well for both UK and Singapore. Furthermore, in the UK procedures like Receivership 
could be used to stall the Administration mechanism as is the case in Singapore too. As a result, 
UK has placed greater focus on reorganization and has abolished the Receivership procedure 
altogether. In India too SARFAESI can be effectively used to stall the reorganisation proceedings 
under BIFR proceedings as well as liquidation. This needs to be addressed to create a 
consolidated framework. Also the mechanism for informal work out in UK and Singapore work 
without any regulatory interference or required sanction. In contrast in India, the RBI has allowed 
prudential and provisioning norms to be changed under the CDR mechanism thereby bringing it 
within the regulatory ambit implying that the process no longer remains informal. There is thus an 
urgent need to consolidate the laws in India including the individual enforcement as well as 
informal procedures. 
Secondly, the formal process for insolvency resolution is essentially a judicial process and the 
courts and judiciary form an integral part of it. Countries have chosen to deal with this in their 
own ways. For instance the UK law has devolved large portion of the responsibilities to the 
insolvency professionals thereby minimizing the role of the judiciary, which is now involved 
primarily in dispute resolution and for setting guidelines for the parties involved. In Singapore on 
the other hand, the court plays a more active role in the judicial management process and the IP is 
in a way subservient to the court system. However, Singapore has also taken considerable effort 
in significantly improving the capacity and capability of its court system. Thus for India the 
choice is open-either to opt for large scale, thorough judicial reforms to improve the efficiency of 
the court system or to build an effective, well functioning IP institution so as to support a 
relatively weaker judiciary. Having said that, given that the role of the courts in resolving 
insolvency will always remain crucial, India still needs to work on improving and reforming the 
judicial machinery. 
Another key element of an effective insolvency resolution framework is to create a strong and 
well-defined liquidation law, which can act as a viable threat forcing parties into reorganization. 
While the reorganization procedures themselves need to be effective and well designed, a timely 
and well-enforced liquidation mechanism will create substantial incentive for the parties involved 
to push for reorganization. Finally, the insolvency resolution law should be such that at various 
points in the entire process there should be clear predictability of outcomes, well written rules 
under the laws clarifying procedures, as well as specific and clearly defined timelines, so as to 
design a resolution framework that will minimize the probability of default and maximize the loss 
given default. Furthermore mechanisms need to be built at every stage of the law to create 
sufficient disincentives for strategic behaviour by the parties involved. Likewise the IP system 
must also be a strong one such that their objectives are aligned with those of the insolvency 
resolution system. 
While the corporate insolvency resolution law can lay out clear and well-defined provisions 
governing the procedures at each stage, effective and timely resolution of an insolvency case will 
depend to a large extent on the efficiency with which those provisions and rules are enforced. 
Hence the success of the new law proposed by a committee in any country including India will 
depend critically on the extent to which good institutions can be created and adequate State 
capacity can be built.  
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